Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15929
Authors: Luca Bellodi; Massimo Morelli; Matia Vannoni
Abstract: We study the consequences of populism on bureaucratic expertise and government performance. We use novel data on about 8,000 municipalities in Italy, over a period of 20 years, and we estimate the effect of electing a populist mayor with a close-election regression discontinuity design. We find that the election of a populist mayor leads to (1) higher turnover among top bureaucrats; (2) an increase in the probability of replacing expert with non-expert bureaucrats; (3) a decrease in the percentage of highly educated bureaucrats; (4) and lower performance overall. Moreover, we find evidencethat the increased inefficiency of the bureaucracy is accompanied by proliferation of council and executive resolutions, in line with the recent literature on overproduction of laws and bureaucratic inefficiency.
Keywords: bureaucracy; turnover; populist politicians; government performance
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Election of a populist mayor (D79) | Higher turnover rate among top bureaucrats (D73) |
| Election of a populist mayor (D79) | Increase in probability of replacing expert bureaucrats with non-expert loyalists (D73) |
| Election of a populist mayor (D79) | Decline in quality of bureaucrats (D73) |
| Election of a populist mayor (D79) | Decline in government performance (revenue collection capacity) (H11) |