Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15928
Authors: Felix Bierbrauer; Aleh Tsyvinski; Nicolas Werquin
Abstract: We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout andendogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to voteand discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We showthat the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge inthe political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead tothe adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobi-lize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributivetaxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voterswho are demobilized.
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Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increased political support for one party (D72) | Adoption of policies favoring the opposing party's voters (D72) |
| Adoption of policies favoring the opposing party's voters (D72) | Decrease in the decisive voter's income (D79) |
| Increased political support for one party (D72) | Decrease in the decisive voter's income (D79) |
| Party strategies (D72) | Voter turnout dynamics (D72) |
| Trade-off between mobilizing own supporters and demobilizing opponents' supporters (D79) | Party policies (J18) |