Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15873
Authors: Marcelo Fernandez; Kirill Rudov; Leeat Yariv
Abstract: We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty.
Keywords: deferred acceptance; incomplete information; matching
JEL Codes: C78; D49; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| incomplete information (D89) | stability of matching outcomes (C62) |
| minimal uncertainty (D81) | breakdown in expected outcomes (D80) |
| singleton cores under complete information (D89) | incentive compatibility (D82) |
| singleton cores under incomplete information (D89) | failure of incentive compatibility (D82) |
| preference uncertainty (D81) | stability of equilibrium outcomes (C62) |
| small cores (D51) | guarantee truthfulness in reported preferences (D11) |