Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15855
Authors: Toomas Hinnosaar
Abstract: I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests.
Keywords: contest design; oligopoly; public goods; rent-seeking; R&D
JEL Codes: C72; C73; D72; D82; D74
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Information about other players' efforts (C72) | Total effort in sequential contests (C72) |
| Full transparency (G38) | Total effort (D29) |
| No transparency (Y70) | Total effort (D29) |
| Earlier-mover advantage (D43) | Efforts and payoffs of players (Z22) |
| Sequential contests (C72) | Total effort converging to prize's value (D44) |
| Contest structure (simultaneous vs sequential) (C72) | Convergence rate of total effort (O47) |