Multiproduct Mergers and Quality Competition

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15830

Authors: Justin Johnson; Andrew Rhodes

Abstract: We investigate mergers in markets where quality differences between products are central and firms may reposition their product lines by adding or removing products of different qualities following a merger. Such mergers are materially different from those studied in the existing literature. Mergers without synergies may exhibit a product-mix effect which raises consumer surplus, but only when the pre-merger industry structure satisfies certain observable features. Post-merger synergies may lower consumer surplus. The level of, and changes in, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index may give a misleading assessment of how a merger affects consumers. A merger may benefit some outsiders but harm others.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
merger without synergies (G34)reduction in aggregate output (E23)
reduction in aggregate output (E23)raise price of low-quality good (D49)
raise price of low-quality good (D49)harm consumers (D18)
merger may increase consumer surplus (D43)pre-merger market structure satisfies certain observable conditions (D40)
pre-merger market structure satisfies certain observable conditions (D40)beneficial product-mix effect (L21)
post-merger cost synergies (G34)unfavorable product-mix effects (L21)
mergers may raise outsider profits (G34)raise consumer surplus (D11)
merger can increase consumer surplus (D16)HHI exceeds levels deemed harmful (L41)

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