Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15809

Authors: Konrad B. Burchardi; Jonathan De Quidt; Selim Gulesci; Benedetta Lerva; Stefano Tripodi

Abstract: Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in the mechanism, which are well-known problems with the BDM. We highlight three such features and test them in the field in rural Uganda, a relevant population for many recent applications. Comprehension is very high, and 86 percent of participants bid optimally for an induced-value voucher, with little variation across treatments. This gives confidence for similar applications, and suggests the comprehension-expediency trade-off is mild.

Keywords: Willingness to Pay; Becker-DeGroot-Marschak; Field Experiment

JEL Codes: C90; C93; D44; O12


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
comprehension of mechanisms (D87)high comprehension rates (Y50)
design features tested (C90)comprehension (Y60)
elicitation mechanisms (C90)optimal bidding (D44)
design features (response mode, price revelation, information about price distribution) (D47)comprehension and bidding behavior (D44)
comprehension (Y60)optimal bidding (D44)

Back to index