A Second-Best Argument for Low Optimal Tariffs

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15697

Authors: Lorenzo Caliendo; Robert Feenstra; John Romalis; Alan M. Taylor

Abstract: We derive a new formula for the optimal uniform tariff in a small-country, heterogeneous-firm model with roundabout production and a nontraded good. Tariffs are applied on imported intermediate inputs. First-best policy requires that markups on domestic intermediate inputs are offset by subsidies. In a second-best setting where such subsidies are not used, the double- marginalization of domestic markups creates a strong incentive to lower the optimal tariff on imported inputs. In a 186-country quantitative model, the median optimal tariff is 10%, and negative for five countries, as compared to 27% in manufacturing from the one-sector, optimal tariff formula without roundabout production.

Keywords: trade policy; monopolistic competition; gains from trade; input-output linkages

JEL Codes: F12; F13; F17; F61


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
optimal tariff (t_opt) (H21)relative monopoly distortion (m_ti) (D42)
optimal tariff (t_opt) (H21)effects of roundabout production (r_ti) (R41)
relative monopoly distortion (m_ti) (D42)optimal tariff (t_opt) (H21)
effects of roundabout production (r_ti) (R41)relative monopoly distortion (m_ti) (D42)
optimal tariff (t_opt) (H21)economic welfare (D69)
optimal tariff (t_opt) lower (H21)double marginalization (J79)

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