Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15696
Authors: Rossella Calvi; Ajinkya Keskar
Abstract: We develop a non-cooperative bargaining model with incomplete information linking dowry payments, domestic violence, resource allocation between a husband and a wife, and separation. Our model generates several predictions, which we test empirically using amendments to the Indian anti-dowry law as a natural experiment. We document a decline in women's decision-making power and separations, and a surge in domestic violence following the amendments. These unintended effects are attenuated when social stigma against separation is low and, in some circumstances, when gains from marriage are high. Whenever possible, parents increase investment in their daughters’ human capital to compensate for lower dowries.
Keywords: Domestic Violence; Dowry; Noncooperative Bargaining; India; Marital Surplus; Womens Empowerment
JEL Codes: J12; D13; I31; O15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Decrease in dowry payments (J12) | Increase in husband's share of marital gains (J12) |
| Decrease in dowry payments (J12) | Increase in domestic violence (J12) |
| Decrease in dowry payments (J12) | Decrease in women's decision-making power (J12) |