Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15694
Authors: Katherine Casey; Rachel Glennerster; Edward Miguel; Maarten Voors
Abstract: Where the state is weak, traditional authorities control the local provision of public goods. These leaders come from an older, less educated generation and often rule in an authoritarian and exclusionary fashion. This means the skills of community members may not be leveraged in policy making. We experimentally evaluate two solutions to this problem in Sierra Leone: one encourages delegation to higher skill individuals and a second fosters broader inclusion in decision-making. In a real-world infrastructure grants competition, a public nudge to delegate lead to better outcomes than the default of chiefly control, whereas attempts to boost participation were largely ineffective.
Keywords: governance; human capital; delegation; traditional authority; foreign aid; community driven development
JEL Codes: H41; I25; O15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Technocratic selection (D73) | Proposal quality (L15) |
| Technocratic selection (D73) | Probability of winning implementation grant (C11) |
| Training (M53) | Proposal quality (L15) |
| Traditional chiefly control (P26) | Proposal quality (L15) |
| Community-driven development (CDD) (O10) | Proposal quality (L15) |
| Traditional chiefly control (P26) | Probability of winning implementation grant (C11) |
| Community-driven development (CDD) (O10) | Probability of winning implementation grant (C11) |