Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15686
Authors: Gloria Gennaro; Giampaolo Lecce; Massimo Morelli
Abstract: We propose a theory of strategic adoption of populism in electoral campaigns,in which a populist campaign attracts disillusioned voters but demobilizes corepartisans. Under these conditions, populism is more tempting for outsider candidatesin districts with low political trust or high economic insecurity, and wherethe race is close. We test the theory on the 2016 presidential election and the 2018and 2020 House elections. We apply automated text analysis to campaign speechesand websites, and construct a continuous index of populism in campaign documents.We provide supportive evidence in favour of the mobilisation effects ofpopulism, and show that outsider candidates, in competitive races, resort to morepopulism in response to higher economic insecurity. Drawing connections betweentheories of electoral mobilization and populism, this paper shows that theinteraction of economic and political conditions is key to understand where politiciansare more likely to ride on popular discontent.
Keywords: populism; electoral campaign; american politics; text analysis
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| populism as a rhetorical strategy (D72) | mobilizes disillusioned voters (D72) |
| populism as a rhetorical strategy (D72) | demobilizes core partisans (D72) |
| outsider candidates (D79) | adopt populist rhetoric (D72) |
| districts with significant disillusionment and economic insecurity (R23) | outsider candidates adopt populist rhetoric (D72) |
| degree of populism in candidates' rhetoric (D72) | mobilization of weak or disillusioned voters (D72) |
| degree of populism in candidates' rhetoric (D72) | depressing turnout among core partisans (D72) |
| populism in campaign documents (D72) | variations in populism within and across candidates (D79) |