Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15679
Authors: Bruno Caprettini; Lorenzo Casaburi; Miriam Venturini
Abstract: Many democracies around the world feature pervasive clientelist practices. Inequality is often considered a key determinant of these practices. By reducing inequality, redistributive policies may therefore undermine clientelism. However, by inducing gratitude and reciprocity among beneficiaries, redistribution may also initiate clientelist exchange. We study the long-term effects of a major redistribution policy: the 1950 Italian land reform. Using a panel spatial regression discontinuity and data for half a century, we show that the large-scale redistribution led to the emergence of a long-lasting clientelist system characterized by political brokers, patronage and targeted benefits. Within this system, the Christian Democratic party, which promoted the reform, experienced persistent electoral benefits.
Keywords: redistribution; voting; clientelism; land reform; Italy
JEL Codes: P16; N44; Q15; D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increase in share of small owner-operated farms (Q12) | Emergence of clientelist practices (O17) |
| Land Reform (Q15) | Reinforcement of DC's political power (D72) |
| Land Reform (Q15) | Increase in public sector employment (J45) |
| Land Reform (Q15) | Increase in share of small owner-operated farms (Q12) |
| Land Reform (Q15) | Increase in electoral support for Christian Democratic Party (DC) (D79) |