Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15675
Authors: Claire Lim; James Snyder
Abstract: In representative democracies, a variety of rules are employed to select and retain public officials to reflect public preferences over policies. We discuss the literature on selection and retention rules for government officials, focusing on ``low-information'' offices. First, we overview the historical origin and the scope of the variation in selection and retention rules. Second, we provide conceptual frameworks for assessing the advantages and disadvantages of direct elections and discuss various factors that influence the functioning of elections. Third, we present empirical regularities. We summarize the baseline effects of the institutional variation and their interaction with factors such as media and compensation. Finally, we discuss outstanding questions in theoretical and empirical fronts, and how the digitization of government information and advances in machine learning can open up new avenues for research.
Keywords: appointment; election; partisan; nonpartisan; voter information; accountability
JEL Codes: H1; H7; K4; N4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| method of selection (C52) | responsiveness to voter interests (D72) |
| elected officials (D72) | responsiveness to voter preferences (D72) |
| appointed officials (D73) | responsiveness influenced by appointing authority (M54) |
| media coverage (L82) | accountability of elected officials (D72) |
| active media coverage (L82) | alignment of nonpartisan elections with voter preferences (K16) |
| compensation levels (J31) | behavior of government officials (D73) |
| adverse selection in electoral systems (D72) | quality of elected officials (D72) |