Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15561
Authors: Alberto Alesina; Bryony Reich; Alessandro Riboni
Abstract: This paper explores how wars make nations, above and beyond their need to raise the fiscal capacity to finance warfare. As army size increases, states change the conduct of war, switching from mercenaries to mass conscript armies. In order for the population to accept fighting and enduring wars, the government elites provide public goods, reduce rent-extraction, and adopt policies to build a "nation'' -- i.e., homogenize the ``culture'' of the population. Governments can instill \textquotedblleft positive" national sentiment, in the sense of emphasizing the benefit of the nation, but they also can instil "negative'' sentiment, in terms of aggressive propaganda against the opponent. We analyze these two types of nation-building and study their implications
Keywords: nationbuilding; nationalism; wars; public good provision; political rents
JEL Codes: H4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Larger armies (H56) | Increased public goods provision (H49) |
| Increased public goods provision (H49) | Enhanced soldiers' effort (H56) |
| Larger armies (H56) | Enhanced soldiers' effort (H56) |
| More homogeneous populations (R23) | Increased effectiveness of public goods in motivating soldiers (H56) |
| Low fiscal capacity (H69) | Decrease in public goods provision (H49) |