Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15559
Authors: Federico Echenique; Ruy Gonzalez; Alistair Wilson; Leeat Yariv
Abstract: Most doctors in the NRMP match with one of their most-preferred internship programs. However, surveys indicate doctors’ preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle: how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We provide one possible explanation. We show that the patterns in the NRMP data may be an artifact of the interview process that precedes the match. Our study highlights the importance of understanding market interactions occurring before and after a matching clearinghouse, and casts doubts on analyses of clearinghouses that take reported preferences at face value.
Keywords: NRMP; Deferred Acceptance; Interviews; First-Rank Matches
JEL Codes: C78; D47; J44
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| interview process (M51) | reported preferences of doctors (I10) |
| interview process (M51) | inflated rankings for matched programs (C78) |
| common component in preferences (D11) | higher reported ranks (A14) |
| interview process + common component in preferences (C99) | improve observed match ranks (C52) |
| reported ranks for match outcomes (D79) | expectations based on untruncated preferences (D11) |