Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15401
Authors: Felix Bierbrauer; Mattias Polborn
Abstract: Gerrymandering undermines representative democracy by creating many uncompetitivelegislative districts, and generating the very real possibility that a partythat wins a clear majority of the popular vote does not win a majority of districts.We present a new approach to the determination of electoral districts, taking a designperspective. Specifically, we develop a redistricting game between two partieswho both seek an advantage in upcoming elections, and show that we can achievetwo desirable properties: First, the overall election outcome corresponds to thepopular vote. Second, most districts are competitive.
Keywords: gerrymandering; legislative elections; redistricting
JEL Codes: D72; C72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| gerrymandering (D72) | disconnect between popular vote and majority of legislative seats (D72) |
| disconnect between popular vote and majority of legislative seats (D72) | party winning majority of votes does not secure majority of seats (D72) |
| redistricting game (D72) | ensures party winning majority of votes also wins majority of seats (D72) |
| strategic voter allocation in a sequential game (C73) | leads to equilibrium where outcome aligns with popular vote (D72) |
| redistricting game (D72) | addresses representation problem and lack of competitive districts (D72) |
| representation problem and lack of competitive districts (D72) | influences incumbents' incentives and behavior (D72) |