Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15344
Authors: Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin
Abstract: We survey recent theoretical and empirical literature on political economy of non-democracies. Dictators face many challenges to their rule: internal, such as palace coups or breakdown of their support coalition, or external, such as mass protests or revolutions. We analyze strategic decisions made by dictators --- hiring political loyalists to positions that require competence, restricting media freedom at the cost of sacrificing bureaucratic efficiency, running a propaganda campaign, organizing electoral fraud, purging associates and opponents, and repressing citizens --- as driven by the desire to maximize the regime's chances of staying in power. We argue that the key to understanding the functioning and ultimately the fate of a nondemocratic regime is the information flows within the regime, and the institutions that govern these information flows.
Keywords: nondemocratic politics; dictatorship; bureaucracy; electoral fraud; revolutions; coup d'etat; media freedom; propaganda; censorship; repressions
JEL Codes: P16; D74; D72; D82; C73; D83
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| information manipulation (D83) | regime stability (C62) |
| censorship and propaganda (M38) | public perception (E66) |
| public perception (E66) | regime longevity (P26) |
| information flow within the regime (D73) | governance outcomes (G38) |
| media control (L82) | public unrest (D74) |
| information asymmetry among citizens (D82) | collective action (D70) |
| choice of subordinates (D70) | threats from challengers (D74) |