A Q Theory of Internal Capital Markets

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15341

Authors: Min Dai; Xavier Giroud; Wei Jiang; Neng Wang

Abstract: We propose a tractable model of dynamic investment, division sales (spinoffs), financing, and risk management for a multi-division firm that faces costly external finance. The model highlights the importance of considering the intertwined nature of the different policies. Our main results are as follows: (1) risk management considerations prescribe the allocation of resources based not only on the divisions' productivity -- as in standard models of ''winner picking'' -- but also their risk; (2) firms may choose to voluntarily spin off productive divisions to increase liquidity; (3) diversification can reduce firm value especially in low liquidity states, as it increases the cost of a spinoff and hampers liquidity management; (4) with corporate socialism, liquidity is less valuable since it is less costly to replenish the firm's liquidity through a spinoff; and (5) division-level investment is set such that the ratio between marginal q and the marginal cost of investing in each division equals the marginal value of cash.

Keywords: internal capital markets; multidivision firms; risk management; corporate socialism

JEL Codes: D92; G3; L25


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Risk management considerations (G52)Resource allocation (D45)
Higher risk divisions (C46)Resource allocation (D45)
Firms' liquidity needs (G33)Decision to spin off divisions (L22)
Cash flow needs (D25)Decision to spin off divisions (L22)
Diversification (G11)Firm value (G32)
Corporate socialism (P16)Firm value (G32)
Corporate socialism (P16)Underinvestment (G31)
Division-level investment decisions (G11)Investment decisions (G11)

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