Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15293
Authors: Aner Sela
Abstract: We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, each of which includes two heterogeneous players with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in all-pay contests where they simultaneously send their costly efforts, and then are either assortatively or disassortatively matched. We characterize the players' equilibrium efforts for a general value function that assigns values for both agents who are matched as a function of their types. We then analyze the cross-effects of the players' types on their expected payoffs as well as on their expected total effort. We show that although each player's value function increases (decreases) in the types of the players in the other set, his expected payoff does not necessarily increase (decrease) in these types. In addition, depending on the value function, each player's type might have either a positive or a negative marginal effect on the players' expected total effort.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D44; J31; D72; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Higher type of player (Z22) | Expected payoff of player with higher type (C79) |
| Lower type of player (Z22) | Expected payoff of player with lower type (C79) |
| Type of other player in set (Y90) | Expected payoff of player with higher type (C79) |
| Higher type of player in other set (C70) | Expected payoff of player with higher type (C79) |
| Lower type of player in other set (C70) | Expected payoff of player with higher type (C79) |
| Type of other player in set (Y90) | Expected payoff of player with lower type (C79) |
| Higher type of player in other set (C70) | Expected payoff of player with lower type (C79) |
| Player types (C70) | Expected total effort (C13) |