Macroprudential Policy, Mortgage Cycles and Distributional Effects: Evidence from the UK

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15275

Authors: Jos Luis Peydr; Jagdish Tripathy; Francesc Rodriguez Tous; Arzu Uluc

Abstract: Macroprudential regulators worldwide have introduced regulations to limit household leverage in light of existing evidence which suggests that high leverage is associated with household distress during crisis. We analyse the distributional effects of such a macroprudential policy on mortgage and house price cycles. For identification, we exploit the universe of UK mortgages and a 15%-limit imposed in 2014 on lenders—not households—for high loan-to-income ratio (LTI) mortgages. Despite some regulatory arbitrage (e.g. increases in LTV and average loan size), more-constrained lenders issue fewer high-LTI mortgages. Partial substitution by less-constrained lenders leads to overall creditcontraction to low-income borrowers in local-areas more exposed to constrained-lenders, lowering house price growth. Following the Brexit referendum (which led to house-price correction), the 2014-policy strongly implies—via lower pre-correction debt—better house prices and mortgage defaults during an episode of house price correction.

Keywords: macroprudential policy; mortgages; credit cycles; inequality; house prices

JEL Codes: E5; G01; G21; G28; G51


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
2014 macroprudential regulation (G28)reduction in the share of high LTI loans issued by constrained lenders (G21)
reduction in the share of high LTI loans issued by constrained lenders (G21)contraction in lending to low-income households (G21)
contraction in lending to low-income households (G21)lower house price growth in local areas exposed to constrained lenders (R31)
2014 macroprudential regulation (G28)lower house price growth in local areas exposed to constrained lenders (R31)
contraction in lending to low-income households (G21)reduced mortgage default rates (G21)
2014 macroprudential regulation (G28)reduced mortgage default rates (G21)

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