Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15270

Authors: Marco Battaglini; Valerio Leone Sciabolazza; Eleonora Patacchini

Abstract: We study the extent to which personal connections among legislators influence abstentions in the U.S. Congress. Our analysis is conducted by observing representatives' abstention for the universe of roll call votes held on bills in the 109th-113th Congresses. Our results show that a legislator's propensity to abstain increases when the majority of his or her alumni connections abstains, even after controlling for other well-known predictors of abstention choices and a vast set of fixed effects. We further reveal that a legislator is more prone to abstain than to take sides when the demands from personal connections conflict with those of the legislator's party.

Keywords: abstention; US Congress; social networks; alumni networks

JEL Codes: D72; D85


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
majority of alumni connections abstain (Y40)legislator's propensity to abstain (D72)
alumni connections (Y80)abstention choices (D72)
conflicting pressures from personal connections and party demands (D72)legislator's propensity to abstain (D72)
party affiliation (D72)influence of alumni connections on abstention (C92)
key votes (D72)influence of social ties on abstention (Z13)

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