Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15221
Authors: Dean Karlan; John List
Abstract: We conducted a fundraising experiment with an international development nonprofit organization in which a matching grant offered by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation raised more funds than one from an anonymous donor. The effect is strongest for solicitees who previously gave to other BMGF-supported, poverty charities. With supporting evidence from two other fundraising experiments as well as a survey experiment, we argue this is consistent with a quality signal mechanism. Alternative mechanisms are discussed, and not ruled out. The results help inform theories about charitable giving decision-making, and provide guidance to organizations and large donors on how to overcome information asymmetries hindering fundraising.
Keywords: public goods; charitable fundraising; asymmetric information; matching grant
JEL Codes: D12; D71; D82; H41; O12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Past donors to BMGF-supported charities (D64) | Stronger response to BMGF matching grant (F35) |
| BMGF matching grants (H81) | Increased donations (D64) |
| BMGF matching grant (H81) | Long-term giving behavior (D64) |
| Information about BMGF as a donor (F35) | Perceived quality of Technoserve (L15) |