Informational Barriers to Market Access: Experimental Evidence from Liberian Firms

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15219

Authors: Jonas Hjort; Vinayak Iyer; Golvine De Rochambeau

Abstract: Evidence suggests that many firms in lower-income countries stagnate because they cannot access growth-conducive markets. We hypothesize that overlooked informational barriers distort market access, excluding productive but ``information-poor'' suppliers. To investigate, we gave a random subset of medium-sized Liberian firms vouchers for a week-long program targeting equal-opportunity access to the input purchases of government, companies, and other organizations---a market that makes up upwards of 80 percent of global GDP. The program exclusively teaches ``sellership'': how to navigate large buyers' complex, formal sourcing procedures. Firms that participate win three times as many formal contracts a year later. The impact is heterogeneous: informational sales barriers bind for about a quarter of Liberian firms. Three years post-training, these firms continue to win desirable contracts, are more likely to operate, and employ more workers. We use a simple model of managers' time-constraints to illustrate a possible explanation for why informational market access barriers can persist and generate poverty-trap-like dynamics among firms, even absent credit constraints. Our results help rationalize common demand-side policies in public procurement that nonetheless appear to scratch at the surface of a bigger distortion.

Keywords: Informational Barriers; Market Access; Experimental Evidence; Liberian Firms

JEL Codes: D2; O1; O25; D83


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Winning contracts training (M53)Number of contracts won (L14)
Winning contracts training (M53)Firm performance (L25)
Winning contracts training (M53)Tenders bid on by firms (D44)
Winning contracts training (M53)Informational sales barriers (binding) (L14)
Winning contracts training (M53)Employment of more workers (J23)
Firm performance (L25)Winning contracts training (sustained improvements) (M53)

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