Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15157
Authors: Kjell G. Salvanes; Julian Vedeler Johnsen; Hyejin Ku
Abstract: Does leave-taking matter for young workers’ careers? If so, why? We propose the competition effect—relative leave status of workers affecting their relative standing inside the firm—as a new explanation. Exploiting a policy reform that exogenously assigned four-week paid paternity leave to some new fathers, we find evidence consistent with the competition effect: A worker enjoys a better post-child earnings trajectory when a larger share of his colleagues take leave because of the policy. In contrast, we find no direct earnings effect resulting from the worker’s own leave when controlling for their relative leave eligibility status within the firm.
Keywords: Leave of absence; Career interruptions; Ranking; Tournament; Promotion; Gender gap
JEL Codes: M51; M52; J16; J22; J24; J31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| share of leave-eligible competitors increases (J22) | focal father's earnings increase (J12) |
| focal father's own leave (J12) | focal father's earnings (J12) |
| focal father's leave eligibility (J22) | focal father's earnings (J12) |
| competition effect (D41) | focal father's earnings change (J12) |