Liquidity Traps in a Monetary Union

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15148

Authors: Robert Kollmann

Abstract: The closed economy macro literature has shown that a liquidity trap can result from the self-fulfillingexpectation that future inflation and output will be low (Benhabib et al. (2001)). Thispaper investigates expectations-driven liquidity traps in a two-country New Keynesian model ofa monetary union. In the model here, country-specific productivity shocks induce synchronizedresponses of domestic and foreign output, while country-specific aggregate demand shockstrigger asymmetric domestic and foreign responses. A rise in government purchases in anindividual country lowers GDP in the rest of the union. The result here cast doubt on the viewthat, in the current era of ultra-low interest rates, a rise in fiscal spending by Euro Area (EA) corecountries would significantly boost GDP in the EA periphery (e.g. Blanchard et al. (2016)).

Keywords: zero lower bound; liquidity trap; monetary union; terms of trade; international fiscal spillovers; euro area

JEL Codes: E3; E4; F2; F3; F4


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Government purchases in an individual country (H59)GDP in the rest of the union (O52)
Government purchases in an individual country (H59)Local GDP (E20)
Local GDP (E20)Foreign GDP (F29)
Negative transmission of home government spending (H59)Foreign GDP (F29)
Expectations-driven liquidity traps (E41)Fiscal multipliers (E62)

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