Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15137
Authors: Antonio Cabrales; Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
Abstract: We consider a model where agents differ in their `types' which determines their voluntary contribution towards a public good. We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under centralized and centralized choice. We show that there exists a top-down sorting equilibrium i.e. an equilibrium where there exists a set of prices which leads to groups that can be ordered by level of types, with the first k types in the group with the highest price and so on. This exists both under decentralized and centralized choosing. We also analyze the model with endogenous group size and examine under what conditions is top-down sorting socially ecient. We illustrate when integration (i.e. mixing types so that each group's average type if the same) is socially better than top-down sorting. Finally, we show that top down sorting is efficient even when groups compete among themselves.
Keywords: top-down sorting; group formation; public good; segregation; integration
JEL Codes: D02; D64; D71; H41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| prices (P22) | group composition (C92) |
| group composition (C92) | individual utility (D11) |
| top-down sorting (L22) | social efficiency (D61) |
| top-down sorting (L22) | group size (C92) |
| integration (F15) | social efficiency (D61) |
| group competition (D70) | top-down sorting (L22) |