Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15129
Authors: Mark Koyama; Desiree Desierto
Abstract: Pandemics have heterogeneous effects on the health and economic outcomes of members of the population. To stay in power, politician-policymakers have to consider the health vulnerability-economic vulnerability (HV-EV) profiles of their coalition. We show that the politically optimal pandemic policy (POPP) reveals the HV-EV profile of the smallest, rather than the largest, group in the coalition. The logic of political survival dictates that the preferences of the least loyal, most pivotal, members of the coalition determine policy.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| HVEV profiles of coalition members (D74) | POPP (C69) |
| preferences of least loyal coalition members (D71) | POPP (C69) |
| health vulnerability high (least loyal group) & economic vulnerability low (I14) | more aggressive policy (E63) |
| health vulnerability low (least loyal group) & economic vulnerability high (I14) | less aggressive policy (E63) |
| preferences of pivotal coalition members (D79) | pandemic policy response (H12) |