Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15099
Authors: Hans Gersbach; Oriol Tejada
Abstract: We introduce semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision with private valuations. Such rules take the form of a two-stage, multiple-round voting mechanism where the output of the first stage is the default alternative for the second stage and the voting thresholds (a) vary with the proposal on the table and (b) require a qualified majority for final approval in the second stage. We show that the (detail-free) mechanism elicits the information about the valuations and uses it to implement the utilitarian optimal public-good level if valuations can be only high or low. This level is chosen after all potential socially optimal policies have been considered for voting. We explore ways to reduce the number of voting rounds and develop a compound mechanism when there are many types of citizens to approximate the optimal public-good level.
Keywords: voting; utilitarianism; implementation; procedural democracy
JEL Codes: C72; D70
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| semiflexible majority voting mechanism (SFM) (D79) | optimal level of public good provision (H42) |
| appropriate choice of voting thresholds and order of alternatives (D79) | maximized utilitarian welfare (D69) |
| high-type citizens voting (D72) | higher public good levels (H40) |
| low-type citizens voting to proceed to subsequent rounds (D72) | prevention of lower public good levels being adopted (H40) |
| semiflexible majority voting mechanism (SFM) (D79) | socially optimal level of public good (xsoc) (H49) |