Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP15075
Authors: Daniel Fershtman; Alessandro Pavan
Abstract: We study search, evaluation, and selection of candidates of unknown quality for a position. We examine the effects of “soft” affirmative action policies increasing the relative percentage of minority candidates in the candidate pool. We show that, while meant to encourage minority hiring, such policies may backfire if the evaluation of minority candidates is noisier than that of non-minorities. This may occur even if minorities are at least as qualified and as valuable as non-minorities. The results provide a possible explanation for why certain soft affirmative action policies have proved counterproductive, even in the absence of (implicit) bias.
Keywords: affirmative action; recruitment; sequential evaluations; learning from endogenous consideration sets
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| SAA policies (Z28) | decreased likelihood of hiring minority candidates (J15) |
| noisier evaluation of minority candidates (J79) | decreased likelihood of hiring minority candidates (J15) |
| SAA policies (Z28) | noisier evaluation of minority candidates (J79) |
| evaluators' experience and biases (C52) | noisier evaluation of minority candidates (J79) |
| SAA policies (Z28) | altered desirability of searching for new candidates (J63) |
| improving evaluation process for minorities (J15) | increased probability of hiring minority candidates (J15) |