Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14992
Authors: Monika Nalepa; Konstantin Sonin
Abstract: Why are transparency regimes so rare? When some politicians have something to conceal, why would their opponents not press for transparency? To analyze transitional justice, we build a model that explains why uncompromised politicians might avoid a transparency regime, which could signal to the voters that they are clean. We model the interaction between an incumbent, an opposition leader, a strategic blackmailer, and voters who know that the opposition politician may be compromised. The incumbent can implement a transparency regime, which would force out a compromised opponent and thus make blackmail impossible. We show that, instead, she might strategically opt for no transparency that keeps all skeletons of the ancient regime in the closet, as it is easier to defeat a potentially compromised opponent. We corroborate our results using original data from the Global Transitional Justice Dataset combined with data on elections, incumbency, and successor autocrat status in post-communist Europe.
Keywords: transitional justice; transparency regime; blackmail; signaling
JEL Codes: P26; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| decision to avoid transparency (D70) | increased likelihood of electoral success for the incumbent (D72) |
| implementing transparency (G38) | exposure of the opposition's past collaboration (D74) |
| exposure of the opposition's past collaboration (D74) | decreased likelihood of electoral success for the incumbent (D72) |
| blackmailer’s information (K42) | voter perceptions (K16) |
| voter perceptions (K16) | preference for non-transparency among incumbents (D72) |