Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14906
Authors: Matteo Cervellati; Giorgio Gulino; Paolo Roberti
Abstract: We exploit a natural experiment involving a randomization of votes across parties within coalitions in all local elections in Italy for over a decade. A lottery on the position of party symbols in the ballot papers coupled with a behavioral focal point allows estimating the average treatment effect of parties for coalition policies. A non-marginal boost of votes shifts budgetary spending towards the treated party's platform, but only for issues that are salient in that party's political manifesto. The effects are stronger for more divisive electoral issues like welfare, taxes, and security. The mechanisms relate to perturbations of legislative representation within majorities that spills over to the appointment of cabinet members affiliated with parties. Empowering different parties leads to a selection of policymakers with different socio-demographic characteristics (particularly gender, age, and occupation). The unintentional experiment helps shed new light on the role of parties and their ideologies.
Keywords: coalition governments; party ideologies and policies; selection of executive politicians; natural experiment
JEL Codes: D70; H70; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| randomization of votes (D72) | coalition policies (C71) |
| boost of votes (D79) | budgetary spending (H61) |
| boost of votes (D79) | policies related to welfare, education, and security spending (H53) |
| empowering different parties (M54) | selection of policymakers (D72) |
| perturbations in legislative representation (D72) | appointment of cabinet members (E60) |
| treating left party (B14) | welfare spending (I38) |
| treating left party (B14) | education spending (H52) |
| treating center-right party (E65) | real estate taxation (K25) |