Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14896
Authors: Matteo Gamalerio; Massimo Morelli; Margherita Negri
Abstract: Do institutions affect the level of openness of immigration policies? We study theoretically and empirically how different electoral systems affect the reception of refugees, comparing Single Round Plurality with Dual Ballot systems. We focus on mayoral elections at the municipality level. Our model predicts that municipalities that elect the mayor with a Dual Ballot system receive more refugee- related fiscal transfers fromthe central government and are more likely to host refugees, compared to municipalities that use a Single Round Plurality system. Using data from Italian municipalities and regression discontinuity design, we provide empirical evidence that confirms the predictions of the theoretical model.
Keywords: electoral rules; immigration; occupational choice; sprar
JEL Codes: D72; J24; J61; R23
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| dual ballot system (D72) | more refugee-related fiscal transfers (H87) |
| dual ballot system (D72) | host more refugees (F22) |
| single round plurality system (D72) | less refugee-related fiscal transfers (F35) |
| single round plurality system (D72) | host fewer refugees (F22) |
| political power dynamics (D72) | immigration policy outcomes (K37) |
| dual ballot municipalities (K16) | higher probability of opening a sprar refugee center (J68) |