Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14876
Authors: Erika Deserranno; Oriana Bandiera; Imran Rasul; Robin Burgess
Abstract: Abstract This paper studies how the social structure of village economies affects policy implementation by local agents. We randomly select one of two viable candidates to deliver an agricultural extension program in rural Ugandan villages. We show that delivery agents favor their own social ties over ex-ante identical farmers connected to the other (non-selected) candidate and that this is inconsistent with output maximization or targeting the poorest. Favoritism disappears when the potential delivery agents belong to the same social group. Using the randomized allocation of the program across villages, we show how unobserved social structures explain the variation in delivery rates and program effectiveness that we often observe in the data.
Keywords: social structure; development policy; social ties; agriculture extension
JEL Codes: O10; O20; D80
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| delivery agents' social ties (L87) | resource allocation favoring own ties (Z13) |
| same social group affiliation of delivery agents (L87) | disappearance of favoritism (J15) |
| social structures (Z13) | variation in delivery rates and program effectiveness (I24) |
| program implementation (C88) | exacerbation of inequality favoring less productive farmers (Q12) |