Expertise, Contingent Fees and Excessive Litigation

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP1487

Authors: Winand Emons

Abstract: Plaintiffs have either strong or weak cases. Both cases should be taken to court, yet weak cases need more work by the attorney than strong cases. Only the attorney knows whether a case needs additional work or not; the plaintiff is forced to rely on the attorney?s recommendation. We show that under contingent fees there will generally be excessive litigation. In contrast, an hourly fee implements the efficient amount of litigation.

Keywords: litigation; contingent fees; expert services; incentives

JEL Codes: D82; K41


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Contingent fees (J33)Excessive litigation (K41)
Hourly fees (J33)Efficient litigation (K41)
Contingent fees (J33)Weak cases pursued excessively (P14)
Standard litigation generates more surplus than effort to strengthen weak cases (K41)Non-loss making contingent fees lead to excessive litigation (K41)
Hourly payment (J33)Avoid excessive litigation (K41)
Hourly payment (J33)Align attorney's incentives with need for additional effort in weak cases (K41)

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