Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14856
Authors: Francesco Decarolis; Gianpiero Mattera; Carlo Menon
Abstract: The inefficiency of the judicial system might affect the extent of delays in the execution of public contracts. We leverage on the large variation in the average length of civil proceedings across Italian jurisdictions and a granular dataset of public contracts to apply a border-discontinuity design strategy. Using a quantile regression approach, we uncover a non-linear, causal effect of court inefficiency: slower courts decrease delays at the lowest two deciles of the delay distribution, and increase delays in the top three deciles of the distribution. These findings fit a framework where contract enforcement is a key driver of contract performance.
Keywords: court efficiency; public procurement; spatial discontinuity; quantile regression
JEL Codes: H11; H57; K41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| court inefficiency (D61) | public contract delays (D86) |
| slower courts (K40) | delays at lowest two deciles (C69) |
| slower courts (K40) | delays at top three deciles (C69) |
| increase in average length of trials (K41) | time delays at 20th percentile (C41) |
| increase in average length of trials (K41) | delays at 80th percentile (C41) |