Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14811
Authors: Robert Akerlof; Hongyi Li; Jonathan Yeo
Abstract: This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study competitions for power—and the role of patronage in such competitions. We construct and analyze a new game—the “chicken-and-egg game”—in which chickens correspond to positions of power and eggs are the game's currency. We find that power tends to accumulate, through a “power begets power” dynamic, in the hands of “lords.” Other subjects behave like their vassals in the sense that they take lords’ handouts rather than compete against them. We observe substantial wealth inequality as well as power inequality. There are also striking gender differences in outcomes—particularly in rates of lordship. In a second treatment, where we eliminate patronage by knocking out the ability to transfer eggs, inequality is vastly reduced and the “power begets power” dynamic disappears.
Keywords: power; patronage; inequality; institutions; gender differences
JEL Codes: D02; D31; D72; J16; O10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Winning elections (K16) | Future electoral success (K16) |
| Having chickens (power) (C92) | Winning elections (K16) |
| Patronage (I38) | Emergence of lords (D40) |
| No patronage (Y70) | Reduction in inequality (I14) |
| Patronage (I38) | Maintaining inequality (I24) |
| Wealth and power inequalities (D31) | Dynamics of patronage (D73) |
| Gender differences (J16) | Likelihood of becoming lords (D14) |
| Women run for election less frequently (J16) | Disparities in power and wealth (D31) |