Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14712
Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol; Jean-Philippe Platteau; Thierry Verdier
Abstract: This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially make a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants to co-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Empirically, the dominant regime in contemporary Muslim countries is the regime of double co-option. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains only where the autocrat's intrinsic legitimacy and the loyalty of his army are strong while the organizational strength of religious movements is rather low. Radical institutional reforms can then be implemented. Rent economies where ultra-conservative clerics are powerful enough to block any institutional reform that they dislike represent another polar case. More frequently, the autocrat resorts to a double-edged tactic: pleasing the official clerics by slowing the pace of reforms, and ensuring the loyalty of the military to be able to put down an opposition instigated by rebel clerics.
Keywords: autocracy; army; instrumentalization of religion; Islam; reforms
JEL Codes: D02; D72; N40; O57; P48; Z12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| autocrat's legitimacy (D73) | ability to implement radical institutional reforms (O17) |
| military's loyalty (H56) | ability to implement radical institutional reforms (O17) |
| strength of military and organizational strength of clerics (H56) | autocrat's ability to implement radical institutional reforms (D73) |
| strong autocrat's legitimacy + assured military loyalty (P26) | aggressive reforms (P39) |
| ultra-conservative clerics' power (Z12) | cautious approach to reforms (E69) |
| double co-option of military and clerics (D74) | optimal strategy for autocrat (D79) |
| strong military + weak clerics (H56) | ability to pursue reforms freely (P26) |
| too strong military (H56) | potential threat to autocrat (D72) |