Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14635
Authors: Joan Esteban; Sabine Flamand; Massimo Morelli; Dominic Rohner
Abstract: This paper proposes an integrated dynamic theory of bargaining and conflict between ethnic groups, delivering novel predictions on secessionist versus centrist conflict. Ethnic identities, inequality and intertemporal preferences are predicted to impact the risk of secessionist conflict and the risk of centrist conflict in different directions. Beside obtaining a full characterization of equilibrium for every set of conditions, we also show empirical evidence that cultural similarity reduces the scope for secessionist conflict (compared to centrist conflict); that small ethnic groups stick more often to peaceful union; that higher patience and higher group inequality fuels secessionism.
Keywords: secessions; conflict; surplus sharing; patience
JEL Codes: C7; D74
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| cultural similarity (Z13) | decreased likelihood of secessionist conflict (F51) |
| cultural similarity (Z13) | increased likelihood of centrist conflict (D74) |
| smaller ethnic groups (J15) | maintenance of peaceful unions (J58) |
| higher levels of patience (J29) | increased frequency of secessionist conflict (F51) |
| greater inequality in economic productivity (O49) | favors secessionist conflict (D74) |