Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14608
Authors: Firoz Ahmed; Roland Hodler; Asadul Islam
Abstract: Many governments in weak democracies countries "manage" the electoral process to make their defeat very unlikely. We aim to understand why citizens decide to vote or abstain in managed elections. We focus on the 2018 general election in Bangladesh and randomize the salience of the citizens' views (i) that election outcomes matter for policy outcomes and (ii) that high voting participation increases the winning party's legitimacy. These treatments increase voting participation in government strongholds and decrease participation in opposition strongholds. The legitimacy treatment has stronger effects. These results have important implications for get-out-the-vote and information campaigns in weak democracies.
Keywords: Electoral Authoritarianism; Managed Authoritarian Elections; Voting Behavior; Field Experiment; Bangladesh
JEL Codes: C93; D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Legitimacy treatment (C32) | Voter turnout in government strongholds (D72) |
| Legitimacy treatment (C32) | Voter turnout in opposition strongholds (D72) |
| Policy treatment (G52) | Voter turnout in government strongholds (D72) |
| Policy treatment (G52) | Voter turnout in opposition strongholds (D72) |