Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14598
Authors: Aner Sela
Abstract: We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in Tullock contests where they simultaneously send their costly efforts, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with the winner of set B and so on until all the agents in the set with the smaller number of agents are matched. We analyze the agents' equilibrium efforts for which an agent's match-value is either a multiplicative or an additive function of the types who are matched. We demonstrate that whether or not both sets have the same number of agents might have a critical effect on their equilibrium efforts. In particular, a little change in the size of one of the sets might have a radical effect on the agents' equilibrium efforts.
Keywords: two-sided matching; Tullock contest
JEL Codes: D44; J31; D72; D82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| size of set A (C55) | equilibrium efforts of agents in set A (C62) |
| size of set B (B00) | equilibrium efforts of agents in set B (D51) |
| equal size of sets A and B (C78) | zero equilibrium efforts of agents (D50) |
| size of set A (larger) (C55) | significant changes in equilibrium efforts of agents (D59) |
| matchvalue function type (C52) | competitive dynamics of agents (L13) |