How Political Insiders Lose Out When International Aid Underperforms: Evidence from a Participatory Development Experiment in Ghana

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14537

Authors: Katharine Baldwin; Dean Karlan; Christopher Udry; Ernest Appiah

Abstract: Participatory development is designed to mitigate problems of political bias in pre-existing localgovernment but also interacts with it in complex ways. Using a five-year randomized controlledstudy in 97 clusters of villages (194 villages) in Ghana, we analyze the effects of a majorparticipatory development program on participation in, leadership of and investment by preexistingpolitical institutions, and on households’ overall socioeconomic well-being. Applyingtheoretical insights on political participation and redistributive politics, we consider thepossibility of both cross-institutional mobilization and displacement, and heterogeneous effectsby partisanship. We find the government and its political supporters acted with high expectationsfor the participatory approach: treatment led to increased participation in local governance andreallocation of resources. But the results did not meet expectations, resulting in a worsening ofsocioeconomic wellbeing in treatment versus control villages for government supporters. Thisdemonstrates international aid’s complex distributional consequences.

Keywords: participatory development; political economy; international aid; distributive politics

JEL Codes: H4; H7; O12; O17; O19


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Participatory development program (O20)Increased participation in local governance (H79)
Participatory development program (O20)Worsening of socioeconomic wellbeing for government supporters (I31)
Increased participation in local governance (H79)Worsening of socioeconomic wellbeing for government supporters (I31)

Back to index