Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14522
Authors: Theresa Finley; Raphael Franck; Noel Johnson
Abstract: This study exploits the confiscation and auctioning off of Church property that occurred during the French Revolution to assess the role played by transaction costs in delaying the reallocation of property rights in the aftermath of fundamental institutional reform. French districts with a greater proportion of land redistributed during the Revolution experienced higher levels of agricultural productivity in 1841 and 1852 as well as more investment in irrigation and more efficient land use. We trace these increases in productivity to an increase in land inequality associated with the Revolutionary auction process. We also show how the benefits associated with the head-start given to districts with more Church land initially, and thus greater land redistribution by auction during the Revolution, dissipated over the course of the nineteenth century as other districts gradually overcame the transaction costs associated with reallocating the property rights associated with the feudal system.
Keywords: institutions; property rights; French Revolution; Coase theorem
JEL Codes: N53; O43; P14; D47
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Percentage of church land confiscated (H13) | Wheat yields in 1841 (N52) |
| Percentage of church land confiscated (H13) | Wheat yields in 1852 (N52) |
| Percentage of church land confiscated (H13) | Land dedicated to wheat cultivation (Q15) |
| Percentage of church land confiscated (H13) | Shares of land left fallow (Q15) |
| Percentage of church land confiscated (H13) | Shares of artificial prairies (Q21) |
| Initial conditions regarding land allocation (Q15) | Long-term agricultural productivity (Q11) |