Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14501
Authors: Massimo Morelli; Andrea Mattozzi; Marcos Y. Nakaguma
Abstract: Populist rulers in economic superpowers have important effects on international relations, conflict risk and inequality. We show that the consequences for civil war risk and inequality are largely negative, while interstate conflict risk increases for dyads with sufficient asymmetry in terms of trade openness and relative military power.
Keywords: populism; protectionism; strategic disengagement; conflict risk; inequality
JEL Codes: No JEL codes provided
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| populism (D72) | protectionism (F52) |
| protectionism (F52) | reduction in trade gains (F14) |
| reduction in trade gains (F14) | increased risk of civil conflict (F51) |
| populism (D72) | increased risk of civil conflict (F51) |
| protectionism (F52) | increased risk of interstate wars (F52) |
| populism (D72) | increased risk of interstate wars (F52) |