Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14412
Authors: Aner Sela; Alex Krumer; Reut Megidish
Abstract: We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.
Keywords: Multistage contests; All-pay auctions; Round-robin tournaments
JEL Codes: D00; L00; D20; Z20; D44; O31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Winning in the first round (D44) | Higher expected payoff by losing in the second round (D81) |
| Number of prizes available (D44) | Players' strategies (C72) |
| Winning in the second round (D44) | Increased competition from other players in subsequent rounds (L13) |
| Winning in one round (C72) | Incentives to lose in subsequent rounds (C72) |