Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14301
Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol; Julie Lassebie; Amma Panin; Eva Raiber; Paul Seabright
Abstract: This paper provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motivefor religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghanainto a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between them-selves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with signi cant stakes. Membersenrolled in insurance give signi cantly less money to their own church compared to membersthat only receive information about the insurance. Enrollment also reduces giving towards otherspiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance.The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherentsperceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in aninterventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church communityis also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.
Keywords: Economics of Religion; Informal Insurance; Charitable Giving
JEL Codes: D14; G22; O12; O17; Z12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Enrollment in a formal funeral insurance policy (G52) | Decreased donations to the church (Z12) |
| Enrollment in a formal funeral insurance policy (G52) | Decreased donations to secular charities (D64) |
| Enrollment in a formal funeral insurance policy (G52) | Alters perceived utility derived from religious giving (D64) |
| Alters perceived utility derived from religious giving (D64) | Reduction in overall contributions (H23) |