The 3 Es of Central Bank Communication with the Public

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14265

Authors: Andrew Haldane; Alistair Macaulay; Michael McMahon

Abstract: In this paper we explore both theoretical and empirical evidence on communication with the general public. The model provides guidance for policy makers by high- lighting some potentially important risks in communicating simply with a broader audience. In particular, in a model where trust and engagement are low, there are benefits to engaging a wider audience. But doing so risks ultimately lowering welfare unless guided by the 3 E's of public communication: Explanation, Engagement and Education. Central banks have made great strides in all three, but numerous challenges remain.

Keywords: monetary policy; communication; general public

JEL Codes: E52; E58


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
simplified communication (L96)increased public engagement (D72)
simplified communication (L96)increased trust in the central bank (E58)
increased public engagement (D72)increased trust in the central bank (E58)
failure to meet expectations (D84)decreased trust in the central bank (E58)
simplified communication (L96)disappointment when actual outcomes deviate from expectations (D84)
disappointment when actual outcomes deviate from expectations (D84)decreased trust in the central bank (E58)
lack of understanding and trust (D83)impeded efficacy of monetary policy (E52)

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