Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14170
Authors: Francesco Amodio; Giorgio Chiovelli; Sebastian Hohmann
Abstract: This paper studies the labor market consequences of ethnic politics in African democracies. Using data from 15 countries, 32 elections, and more than 400,000 individuals, we implement a regression discontinuity design that compares individuals from ethnicities connected to parties at the margin of electing a local representative in the national parliament. Having a local ethnic party politician in parliament increases the likelihood of being employed by 2-3 pp. The available evidence supports the hypothesis that this effect results from strategic interactions between politicians and traditional leaders, the latter being empowered to allocate land and agricultural jobs in exchange for votes.
Keywords: Ethnic Politics; Employment; Democracy; Traditional Leaders; Africa
JEL Codes: J15; J70; O10; P26; Q15
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| strategic interactions between politicians and traditional leaders (D72) | likelihood of being employed (J68) |
| traditional leaders empowered to allocate agricultural land and jobs (P26) | likelihood of being employed (J68) |
| having a local ethnic party politician in parliament (D72) | likelihood of being employed (J68) |
| having a local ethnic party politician in parliament (D72) | employment in agricultural sector (J43) |
| having a local ethnic party politician in parliament (D72) | employment in manufacturing, services, or public sector (J68) |