Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP14049
Authors: David Abrams; Roberto Galbiati; Emeric Henry; Arnaud Philippe
Abstract: Exploiting features of the North-Carolina judicial system, elections and forced rotation of judges, we overcome major challenges hampering the identifi cation of the existence and source of sentencing variation over the electoral cycle. We show that when elections approach, sentencing for felonies increase. This increase is driven by decisions taken by judges present in their district of election, and only when elections are contested. When judges operate outside their district of elections, sentencing decisions do not signi ficantly vary over the electoral cycle. Our results demonstrate the existence of strategic sentencing by judges in an attempt to please voters and allowus to discard alternative explanations for the rise along the cycle, such as behavioral motives or contextual explanations.
Keywords: Electoral cycles; Judicial behavior; Sentencing decisions
JEL Codes: K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Electoral cycles (K16) | Sentencing for felonies (K14) |
| Contested elections (D72) | Sentencing for felonies (K14) |
| Judges' home districts (K16) | Sentencing for felonies (K14) |
| Electoral context (K16) | Sentencing variation (K40) |
| Electoral pressure (D72) | Judges' strategic decisions (K41) |
| Judicial stress during elections (K16) | Sentencing variation (K40) |
| Contextual changes during elections (K16) | Sentencing variation (K40) |
| Serious crimes (K42) | Increase in sentence severity (K40) |
| Electoral cycles (K16) | Vulnerable groups' sentencing (K38) |