Patronage for Productivity: Selection and Performance in the Age of Sail

Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13963

Authors: Hansjoachim Voth; Guo Xu

Abstract: Patronage is a byword for poor performance, yet it remains pervasive. We study the selection effects of patronage in the world’s most successful navy – the British Royal Navy between 1690 and 1849. Using newly collected data on the battle performance of more than 5,800 naval officers promoted – with and without family ties – to the top of the navy hierarchy, we find that connected promotees outperformed unconnected ones. Therewas substantial heterogeneity among the admirals in charge of promotions. Discretion over appointments thus created scope for ”good” and ”bad” patronage. Because most admirals promoted on the basis of merit and did not favor their kin, the overall selection effect of patronage was positive.

Keywords: patronage; management; performance; selection; Royal Navy; motivation

JEL Codes: N01; H11; L32


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
connected officers (Y80)performance (D29)
connected officers (Y80)promotion to postcaptain (M51)
admiralty's information about abilities (Y50)connected officers' performance (L25)
performance advantage (L25)time (C41)
better assignments (C78)performance of connected officers (H83)
connections (Y80)performance (D29)
connections enhance performance (D29)ability (G53)

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