Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13961
Authors: Milena Djourelova; Ruben Durante
Abstract: Do politicians tend to adopt unpopular policies when the media and the public are distracted by other events? We examine this question by analyzing the timing of the signing of executive orders (EOs) by U.S. presidents over the past four decades. We find robust evidence thatEOs are more likely to be signed on the eve of days when the news are dominated by other important stories that can crowd out coverage of EOs. Crucially, this relationship only holds in periods of divided government when unilateral presidential actions are more likely to be criticized by a hostile Congress. The effect is driven by EOs that are more likely to make the news and to attract negative publicity, particularly those on topics on which president and Congress disagree. Finally, the timing of EOs appears to be related to predictable news but not to unpredictable ones, which suggests it results from a deliberate and forward-looking PR strategy.
Keywords: mass media; strategic timing; political accountability; presidential powers; US politics
JEL Codes: D02; D72; H11; L82
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| High news pressure (E39) | Increased likelihood of signing EOs (D72) |
| Days preceding significant news events (G14) | Increased likelihood of signing EOs (D72) |
| Divided government (D72) | Increased likelihood of signing EOs during high news pressure (D72) |
| Predictable news events (G14) | Increased likelihood of signing EOs (D72) |
| Signing EOs (F53) | Minimizing negative coverage (M38) |