Working Paper: CEPR ID: DP13930
Authors: Sascha O. Becker; Erik Hornung
Abstract: Did the Prussian three-class franchise, which politically over-represented the economic elite, affect policy-making? Combining MP-level political orientation, derived from all roll call votes in the Prussian parliament (1867–1903), with constituency characteristics, we analyze how local vote inequality, determined by tax payments, affected policy-making during Prussia's period of rapid industrialization. Contrary to the predominant view that the franchise system produced a conservative parliament, higher vote inequality is associated with more liberal voting, especially in regions with large-scale industry. We argue that industrialists preferred self-serving liberal policies and were able to coordinate on suitable MPs when vote inequality was high.
Keywords: inequality; political economy; three-class franchise; elites; Prussia
JEL Codes: D72; N43; N93; P26
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| industrialists' political preferences (P16) | voting behavior of MPs (D72) |
| concentration of wealth and tax contributions (H29) | political preferences of industrialists (P16) |
| landownership inequality (Q15) | conservative voting (K16) |
| vote inequality (D72) | political orientation of MPs (D72) |
| higher vote inequality (D72) | higher probability of MPs voting for liberal policies (D72) |